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This study aimed to analyze the concept of Indonesian 
Defence Management in the 21st century in the context 
of Indonesian Maritime Security and to determine the 
readiness of defence management capabilities in 
facing threats. Research method used is descriptive 
qualitative with data collection methods through in-
depth interview and documentation. The results 
showed that to improve maritime security in Indonesia 
has not been implemented in a structured and 
comprehensive defense in accordance with the 
management perspective of the countries more 
advanced, especially on defense preparedness in 
logistics management such as the management and 
alutsista availability owned Indonesia. 
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis 
konsep manajemen pertahanan Indonesia di abad 21 
dalam rangka keamanan maritim Indonesia, serta 
untuk mengetahui kesiapan kemampuan manajemen 
pertahanan dalam menghadapi berbagai ancaman. 
Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah deskriptif 
kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data melalui 
wawancara mendalam dan dokumentasi. Hasil 
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa dalam upaya 
meningkatkan keamanan maritim di Indonesia belum 
diimplementasikan secara terstruktur dan 
komprehensif sesuai dengan perspektif manajemen 
pertahanan dari negara-negara yang lebih maju, 
terutama tentang kesiapan dalam manajemen logistik 
pertahanan seperti pengelolaaan dan ketersediaaan 
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South China Sea dispute last 
few years, political and security 
escalate, because the government of 
the People Republic of China (PRC) 
claimed the South China Sea that make 
other countries do the same. 
Consequently, the diplomatic relations 
between the countries in the region 
become strained. Six countries 
disputing the South China Sea region, 
namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei 
Darussalam. Paracel and Spratly 
islands dispute directly affect the 
stability of the economic, political, and 
security of the region.  
The dispute became a central 
issue, not only for the region region 
countries, but also for large countries 
that have an interest in this area. 
United States decided to help resolve 
any effort peaceful resolution in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Border dispute 
began lead to Indonesian maritime 
territory, when Chinese claims over 
2,361-kilometer square of Natuna 
islands. Lately, China has included 
most of the area Natuna into Nine 
dashed line on territorial map created 
in 1974 which means the claim to 
Natuna has been done by China for a 
long time (Hardoko, 2016). 
The Pentagon report states, 
since December 2013 China has 
around 2,900 hectares of land 
reclamation South China Sea, 
particularly on Ferry Croos Reef, 
which is part of the Spratlys. Not only 
the construction of civil and military 
facilities, the airstrip construction, a 
greenhouse area 500 square kilometers 
and 200 personnel placements at the 
People Liberation Army (PLA) of 
China. In addition, there has also been 
standing firm runway with 3 km a 
length and 300 m a width, which is 
able to accommodate the jet bombing 
H-6 and a large military transport 
aircraft Y-20. (Pusat, 2016) 
Paracel and Spratly as a 
strategic area in international 
navigation path. With region control, 
these countries dominate Sea land of 
Communications (SLOC) and Sea 
land of trade (SLOT). In other words, 
these countries will also master the 
traffic investment, international trade 
and tourism value reached US $ 5.3 
trillion per year, including 85% of the 




world's oil supplies from eastern Asia 
(Hardoko, 2016).   
On other hand, the Chinese 
military aggression strength-based, 
proven to have violated international 
maritime law conventions (UNCLOS) 
of the United Nations. China violated 
an agreement with the 10 ASEAN 
countries, as stipulated in Declaration 
on parties Conduct in South China Sea 
(DOC) in 2002. Claims and 
reclamation efforts undertaken by 
China are unfounded and not in 
accordance with international law.  
Indonesia as the chair of 
ASEAN, is obliged to act as a mediator 
in conflict management South China 
Sea. The conflict concerns region 
conditions, because South China Sea 
is a strategic trade shipping lines that 
intersect with ALKI I, II and III belong 
to Indonesia. If the South China Sea in 
politicization by China, it is not only 
the regional conditions are disturbed 
but also national sovereignty, 
especially seepage claims China has 
stretched into Natuna territory. 
Although not a claimant states on 
South China Sea territory, but must 
have a firmness against China. For this 
the Government of Indonesia should 
quickly map out military and defense 
strategy in dealing with conflict in 
South China Sea. In Act No. 3 of 2002 
on the defense stated that the President 
to be responsible for formulating a 
common defense policy in regulation 
form No. 41 of 2010 and defense 
strategy in government decree 97 of 
2015 which is aligned with the draft 
that was published in National 
Medium Term Development Plan 
(Indonesia: Rencana Pembangunan 
Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN)) 
about Defense Strategic Plan on 2015-
2019 and 2015-2019. The rules 
relating to the strategic issues of 
defense and national security, 
including border area conflict, 
including security threats and 
lawlessness in the border areas and the 
national security system integrative. 
Strategy and defense policy 
that is geared to meet the Minimum 
Essential Force (MEF). Model-based 
capacity building of national defense 
policy MEF, increased budget form, 
defense equipment modernization, 
defense posture development and 
reserve components addition 
throughout the defense establishment, 
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country defense, including border 
areas, especially the issue Natuna due 
to potential boundary disputes in the 
Parcel and Spratly.  
Nawacita program focuses on 
development in the maritime field so 
that the necessary sustainable 
development in the maritime sector. 
To reach that stage, required Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA). Doorey 
(2015) explained that transnational 
threat is a threat that knows no 
countries boundaries and actors in 
several levels, among other countries 
and organizations. Indonesia faces 
challenges in maritime sector 
development, one of them in maritime 
security area. The main factor that the 
problem is still not yet integrated the 
various agencies and sectors that are in 
the maritime sector. Indonesia is 
encouraged to be more involved in 
various maritime security cooperation, 
especially in the ASEAN region to 
prevent common threats to disrupt 
trade in the maritime sector as a major 
income source for the country's 
economy. 
In facing South China Sea 
conflict and dynamism in Asia Pacific 
region, Indonesia Government must 
show firmness in defending the 
Unitary Republic of Indonesia 
(Indonesia: Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indoneisa (NKRI)) through naval 
diplomacy. Furthermore, it should 
change of defense strategy, 
management and military force use to 
confront military threats and new 
models from conventional warfare. 
Indonesia should also accelerate 
changes in defense posture adequate 
and able to deal with conflict in South 
China Sea region (Arsyad, 2016). 
Conflict South China Sea is a real 
threat for Indonesia (Greater, 2014) 
focused on military power 
development Natuna Islands 
(Bhatnagar, 2016).  
The complexities in Asia 
Pacific region and South China Sea 
conflict, forced Indonesian 
government to immediately create a 
policy to protect the NKRI. Therefore, 
this study focuses on defense 
management in Indonesian maritime 
security. 
Joint Concepts for Defence 
Management 
Generally, Joint Concepts 




interpreted as relations strategic 
guidance for the development and 
ability execution of Joint Force 
(combined power) to changes 
doctrine, organization, training, 
material, leadership and education, 
personnel, facilities, and policies 
(Mack, 2016; Walton et al, 2015; 
Williams, 2014). Another notion is to 
describe how to build a joint force 
commander to plan, prepare, deploy, 
use, defend and move joint forces 
(Williams, 2014). 
There are two main objectives 
in developing and planning a Joint 
Concept, the Force Development and 
Employment Force. In Force 
Development, influenced by the 
Defense Resource Management, 
Human Resource Management 
Defense and the Defense Logistics 
Management. Meanwhile, in Force 
Employment, influenced by the Joint 
Operational Planning and Training & 
Exercise for the Joint Concept 
(Mahoney, 2015). Dual Purpose of 
joint Concept Models (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Dual Purpose of Joint Concept (Mahoney, 2015) 
In line with these objectives, 
establish process to Joint Concept 
(Joint Concept Development) as an 
advanced piece of Joint Concept 
Planning, according to Command 
(2003), there are five steps that must 
be followed, as follows: Prospectus 
Development, Research and writing, 
Concept evaluation, Coordination and 
approval, and concept 
Implementation. 
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Five steps are part which 
becomes a cooperation area between 
the civilian and military to develop a 
joint concept that could be a solution 
to future challenges for a country to 
improve its capabilities as expected 
(Young, 2003; Baumann, 2008; 
Fleming, 2011), developing and 
carrying out research and write the 
desired concept (Lilien et al, 2006; 
Crossley, 2004; Gompert, 2003). In 
developing these five elements, civil-
military role is important to build a 
joint concept that suits needs, 
challenges solution and improve 
capabilities (Tatham and Rietjens, 
2016) 
Maritime Security 
There is no universal definition 
about maritime security 
internationally accepted (Rahman, 
2009). Maritime security is a 
comprehensive maritime domain and 
systemic concept. Presenting multiple 
and inter-related requirements for 
cooperative security by state and non-
state actors (addresses traditional and 
non-traditional security challenges). 
Maritime security includes: 
coordinating collective and 
cooperation security to protect 
national, regional and global 
importance interests, purpose and core 
values (state sovereignty), navigation 
freedom, economic development, 
environment and ocean resources, 
human and social development, and 
political stability (Cordner, 2014). 
 Maritime security is an 
interesting issue (Germond, 2015; 
Bueger, 2015; Widen, 2015; Frittelli, 
2005; 2007; Gilpin, 2007) as the new 
challenges that need support to 
overcome (Bueger, 2015), 
characterised as a basic wicked 
problem (Bateman, 2011), a term that 
draw sattention to new challenges and 
rallies support the various problems 
because of economic activities such as 
transportation, resource extraction and 
fishing. To defend maritime security 
required continued investment in 
infrastructure: both in terms of 
hardware such as ships, ports and 
communication networks; and a stable 
environment for trade, not only around 
the coast but in other places, but also 
on the high seas (Lin, 2015). 
Monitoring the maritime security is 
not an easy task as over 90 % of global 
trade carried by water (Burns, 2013).  




In defending maritime 
security, can not be separated from the 
military, especially naval readiness. 
The defense readiness must be 
supported by the armed forces, 
especially with regard to sophisticated 
defense systems including war fleet 
readiness (Droff, 2016). According to 
Germond and Germond-Duret (2016), 
States extend their control over extra-
national spaces under ocean 
governance (marine resources 
protection) and maritime security 
(against sea criminal actors). 
Research Method 
Research method used are 
descriptive qualitative. Qualitative 
research methods is verbal 
descriptions without statistical 
analysis use techniques (Sangaji & 
Sopiah, 2010). Design on a qualitative 
descriptive study was conducted in 
case studies.  
The informants came from 
officials of the Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Professionals. Data analysis process in 
this study derived from sources and 
records collected with created 
verbatim or matrix on interviews 
results for analyzed. 
Result and Discussion 
Indonesian Defence Management 
Concept within Maritime Security 
Change in Defence 
Management Indonesia became 
Military Operations Other Than War 
(Indonesia: Operasi Militer Selain 
Perang (OMSP)) as the appropriate 
measures to NKRI protect because 
Indonesia not involved in the South 
China Sea conflict.  
Improved maritime defense 
management focused on people, 
readiness, and equipment. Force 
Maritime Defense used to 
implemented four elements of defense 
strategy, ie deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, and maritime 
security (Supandi, 2016). 
Defense management in 
maritime pivot concept based on 
government program. Therefore, 
maritime pivot has a range of activities 
exploiting marine potentials are not 
been developed, such as the fishing 
industry, shipbuilding, marine 
resources exploration, sea waves 
energy, energy generation, research 
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centers, fishermen settlements, marine 
tourism and interests other countries. 
The measures launched by 
government in defense  management 
are: Defense Resource Management, 
Human Resources Management 
Defense, Defense Logistics 
Management and Joint Concepts for 
Military Operation. 
The first strategy is Defense 
Resource Management; Using natural 
resources in Indonesian waters by 
humans according maritime pivot 
concept. For example marine areas 
used as shipping, tourism, traditional 
fishing areas, Navy training areas, 
conservation area, coastal reclamation 
area, oil & gas area, drilling and other 
activities.  
From research result, potential 
sea in the Riau Archipelago, Natuna 
regency exploited through fishing 
activity (more than 1 million tons per 
year), D-Alpha gas field (total 
petroleum reserves estimated at 1 400 
386 470 a barrel and natural gas as 
much as 112 356. 680,000, barrels 
with total reserves of 222 trillion cubic 
feet), Gas Hydrocarbon (by 46 TCT), 
attractions, etc. 
Management of National 
Resources is one of the pillars within 
Economic Instruments framework in 
country defense  through agency 
(institution) role. In addition, the 
Government also optimize economic 
operators role in support national 
economic growth improvement in 
achieve strong national economy 
(Defence White Paper, 2014). 
The second strategy is the 
Defense of Human Resources 
Management; For the national defense 
is one of state government and 
organized functions by fostering and 
utilizing all national resources to 
create defense components and ability 
to country citizens defend, who are 
ready at any time tackling threats both 
military threats and non-military 
threats, while considering its use for 
welfare. 
From the findings, it seemed 
that planning framework and 
operations implementation in Natuna 
regency, Indonesia Government will 
add 2,000 personnel force comprising 
paskhas (Kopaskhas) Air Force, 
Marine Corps Navy, and Army Raider. 
According to the Minister of Defence, 




to date there have been 18 fighter 
planes at the airfield Hawk 100/200 
Supadio, Pontianak. That as the 
government's efforts in NKRI defend 
and maritime security. The legal basis 
for human resource development 
defense is the 1945 Constitution 
Chapter X of Citizens and Residents, 
Article 27 paragraph (3), Act No. 3 of 
2002 on National Defence. 
The third strategy is the 
Defense Logistics Management; From 
research results conducted that related 
to the Conflict South China Sea, 
Indonesian Government has done 
some preparation, build bases Sukhoi 
SU-27 that was built in 2014, alerting 
helicopter AH-64E, add 1 battalion 
personnel infantry, patrol jet fighters 
squadron, to deploy dozens of 
warships of the Western Fleet 
Command (Indonesia: Komando 
Armada Wilayah Barat (Koarmabar)) 
Navy  
Logistical support is directed 
also to guarantee and meet material 
needs, facilities and services quickly 
and accurately, both to support 
strength preparation, training activities 
and operation according to the 
applicable procedures. Logistical 
support can be classified as: budget 
support and fees, supplies and 
logistical support, transport support 
services as well as support services 
and other facilities. The fourth 
strategy, Joint Concepts for Military 
Operation; From the research finding, 
Indonesian Government have three 
main dimensions in this case, namely 
Navy, Air Force, and Army, as well as 
civilian agencies in carrying out the 
functions and responsibilities to deal 
with conflict in the South China Sea.  
Their operation conducted by 
the Indonesian Government, both 
strategic intelligence operations and 
joint operations are being conducted to 
improve security in the Natuna 
Islands. Efforts have been made by the 
Indonesian Government is align and 
harmonize each agency to realize 
vision and mission in facing threats 
and challenges in South China Sea 
area. The things above are the efforts 
taken by Indonesian Government to 
maximize concept within a joint 
military operation framework 
conducted by inter-agency resulting in 
the Joint Concept Planning (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Joint Concept Planning Model (Mahoney, 2015) 
 
Joint Military Operation 
Planning Concept in Indonesia needs 
to be planning a joint operation of the 
military element (specific tasks). In the 
model, it appears that the Joint 
Concept Planning Strategy is built into 
the Area Mission, Objectives 
Readiness Requirements. 
Readiness of Indonesian Defense 
Management Capabilities within 
Maritime Security 
In preparation, the Indonesian 
government seeks to improve various 
preparations ability, ie people, 
equipment and readiness aspects. 
First, People; The research result that 
personnel are working throughout 
human element in the organization 
ranging from highs to lows. Each 
personnel has duties and each 
organization responsibilities in main 
tasks support in accordance with the 
Defence Human Resources 
Management concept. Within this 
concept, attention focused on defend 
of strength, power, operating aid, 
education and training, maintenance 
personnel, and administration. 
Second, Equipment; From data 
research, defense equipment has been 
purchased and ordered by Indonesian 
Government. Based on data ideal from 
various researchers, the number of 
defense equipment owned by 
Indonesia reached 50%, but this 
amount estimated able to achieve 
Indonesian alutsista. Defense 
equipment belonging Army, Navy, 
and Air Force (Table 1)
 
 




Table 1. Alutsista TNI 
No Kesatuan Alutsista 
1 Indonesian Army • 103 MBT Leopard II 
• 50 Tank Marder 
• 38 Howitzer Digital Caesar Nexter 
• 36 MLRS Astross II Mk6 
• 900 Trucks Force 
• 800 Rantis 
• 80 Panser Anoa 
• 5 Starstreak Missile Battery 
• 5 Mistral Missile Battery 
• 180 Javelin Anti-Tank Missile 
• 150 Anti-Tank Missile Nlaw 
• 20 Bell helicopter 412Ep 
• 16 Fennec helicopter 
• 6 Mi17 helicopter 
2 Indonesian Navy • 37 Amphibian Tank BMP3F 
• 25 Amphibious vehicle LVTA1 from Korea (grant batch 2) 
• 5 Amphibious tanks types BTR-4 (order 55 units) 
• 10 MLRS RM Grad 
• 11 Anti-submarine helicopters Panther 
• 4 Maritime surveillance aircraft CN235 MPA 
• 4 Transport helicopters Bell 412 Ep 
• 3 Warships light frigate "Bung Tomo Class" 
• 3 Warship types of KCR (Quick Ship Missile) 60 m 
• 2 Warship type of KCR 40m 
• 3 Warships types of LST (Landing Ship Tank) 
• 2 Warships types of BCM (Bantu Cair Minyak) 
• 3 Battleships type of fast patrol 
• 1 Battleships type of screen training 
• 2 Submarine Kilo 
• 2 Hydrografi Ship 
3 Indonesian Air Force • 12 Coin Super Tucano Aircraft 
• 16 Golden Eagle fighter jet 
• 8 F16 fighter jet equivalent of block 52 (order number 30 
F16 upgrade) 
• 5 Medium transport aircraft CN295 
• 8 Hercules aircraft 
• 6 Cougar helicopters 
• 6 UAV Heron 
• 4 Radar Thales 
• 1 Sukhoi simulator 
Source: author’s data collection 
The Indonesian military 
capabilities continue to experience 
significant increases. Modernization 
of defense equipment as stated in the 
MEF (Minimum Essential Force) 
proved able to meet the needs of 
defense equipment Indonesia. Meeting 
the needs of equipment or the defense 
equipment related to the budget of the 
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Indonesian government granted to 
organize MEF in every five years.  
Third, Readiness; This concept 
emphasizes the readiness of the 
Government of Indonesia in facing the 
South China Sea conflict. Readiness is 
made up of the needs of defense 
equipment as well as personnel or 
human resources who have the ability 
and expertise. From the research that 
has been done by Indonesia still has a 
rather low in readiness in facing the 
South China Sea. Therefore, the 
Indonesian government should 
improve themselves in the face of 
conflict. 
Based on the research results, 
and the Strategic Intelligence Agency 
intelligence efforts and provide 
information about the factors that may 
be a threat to the Homeland (table 2)
Table 2. Military readiness in Maritime Security Operations 
 Current Condition Ideal % Readiness 
Personnel 526 Personel 2000 Personel 26,3% 
55% 
Army 57 87 66% 
Navy 102 329 31% 
Air Force 120 253 47% 
Training and 
Activity Level 
Routine performed by 
the respective Unit 
Routine and special 75% 
Equipment /  
Infrastructure 
Field development navy 
and airfields 





Headquarters and 13 






Equipment Status C-130H Hercules, EMB 
34 Super Tucano, 
AS355 (Light 
Helicopter), EC725 
Super Cougar, AS565S 
Panther (Helicopter),  
EC135 (light 
helicopter), C-295, F-
16C, AH-64D,  Apache, 
Bonanza Light Aircraft, 
3 submarine, Leopard, 1 
Infantry Battalion, 
Hawk, F100 
SU-35, SU30, SU-27, F-
16, T-50i,, AH-64E 
Apache, Mi-35p, UAV, 
5 submarine, 1 Rider 
Battalion, 1 Arhanud 
Batalyon, 1 Aviator 
Squadron, 1 Marine 
Battalion, 1 Paskhas 
Battalion, Oerlikon 
Skyshield, Pantshir-S1, 
MLRS Astross II 
55% 
War stock supplies War Stock and Based on 
Requestn 
Able to meet operating 
requirements 
50% 
Source: author’s data collection 




From research data about the 
Indonesia Government readiness in 
facing the South China Sea conflict. 
The result is Indonesia Government 
readiness reached 55% (personnel and 
equipment preparation number). The 
Indonesian government has been 
preparing to facing conflict, but such 
efforts should be increased. 
Conclusion 
First, The government 
measures in defense management are: 
Defense Resource Management, 
Human Resources Management 
Defense, Defense Logistics 
Management and Joint Concepts for 
Military Operation. Second, Model-
based capacity building of national 
defense policy MEF, conducted an 
increased budget, modernization of 
defense equipment, defense posture 
development and additions to reserve 
components throughout defense 
establishment. Third, The Indonesian 
government attempted to improve 
various preparations ability from 
aspects of people, equipment and 
readiness. 
Recommendation 
The need for socialization or 
learning to all stakeholders and the 
elements involved on Management 
Concepts of Defense and Indonesian 
Defense Readiness Management 
Capabilities in the 21st century. 
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